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I. Abstract 
Based on the insight that the type of product an economy exports can have important 
implications for its economic performance and that goods exported predominantly by rich 
countries will have different characteristics from those exported by poor countries, Lall et 
al (2006) put forward a novel means of classifying commodities based on the income 
levels of a product’s main exporters. At around the same time Hausmann et al (2006) 
following a similar approach put forward a slightly different form of product classification 
and Rodrik (2006) applied this specifically to an analysis of China. This paper highlights 
the difference between the approaches and its implications for the analysis of China, 
which appears less ‘special’ using the approach of Lall et al.   
 
Paper prepared for the conference on Sustainable Industrial Development in China, 
Fudan University, April 2009.  
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II. Introduction 
The argument that what it exports has strong implications for a country’s growth 
prospects has a long tradition in development studies. Initially in the Prebisch-Singer 
version this focused on differences between manufactured and primary products. 
However following the shift of developing economies into manufactured exports a new 
version of this argument has emerged based on a difference between exports of 
manufactures in which developed countries dominate and those manufactures produced 
in developing economies. The difference is seen principally as due to technology, so that 
a higher skill-higher technology content, gives developed economy producers a stronger 
market position protecting profit margins and ensuring a higher value added content (see 
for example, Kaplinsky 2006). Not only is it argued that for technologically more 
sophisticated manufactures terms of trade shifts will be less unfavourable than for simpler 
manufactures, but prospects for demand growth are also seen as more favourable. These 
arguments have a particular relevance to China for several reasons. China’s vast exports 
of manufactures now span a wide range of products and its competition has been seen as 
simultaneously depressing world market prices for labour-intensive manufactures (like 
clothing) whilst also taking world market share in more technologically advanced products 
(like electronics). In this latter context China’s move into a number of relatively 
sophisticated and dynamic product lines is seen as a major threat to economies in S.E 
Asia and Latin America, particularly in the large North American market (Lall and Albadejo 
2004, Lall and Weiss 2005, Jenkins et al 2008). In addition it has been argued that 
China’s own economic growth has been strongly aided by its ‘premature’ shift of export 
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structure, so that China’s export basket has moved much closer to that of developed 
economies than would be expected given its income level.        
These are important arguments that as yet are difficult to resolve empirically. This 
paper examines two recently proposed ways of assessing trade structure and how they 
relate to China’s recent performance. Further empirical work is needed to assess fully the 
impact of export structure on growth prospects and this paper should be seen as 
preliminary contribution. 
III. World market trends in the 1990’s 
Data on the terms of trade case of a strong decline in the prices of developing country 
manufactures relative to developed country manufactures are at least suggestive if not 
conclusive. In a recent survey Kaplinsky (2006) cites the detailed work of Maizels looking 
at the import prices in the US, EU and Japanese markets, which in general show 
developing country manufactured export prices falling, but significantly with the prices of 
goods from the East Asian newly industrialised economies (with a more technologically 
sophisticated export structure) falling more slowly than the average. Kaplinsky and 
Santos-Paulino (2005) looked in detail at manufactured import prices into the EU at a 
highly disaggregate level finding that in about one third of case prices of goods from China 
fell. In general for other countries price falls were less likely the higher the income level of 
the exporting economy. They authors draw the conclusion that over the period the greater 
China’s participation in a global market the more likely it was for prices to fall and that this 
price competition was felt more strongly for low income exporters.     
On the issue of demand growth UNCTAD analysed trends over the 1990’s and 
identified the fastest growing manufactured exports. Table 1 summarises the position of 
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the 20 fastest growing products using a weighted comprehensive index explained in 
Mayer et al (2002).  
Table 1: Ranking of twenty most dynamic products in world trade 1980-1998 
Ranking SITC 
code 
Product group Developing 
country 
share %a 
Factor 
classification 
1 776 Transistors and semi-
conductors 
46 High skill-high 
technology 
2 752 Computers 36 High skill-high 
technology 
3 871 Optical instruments 30 High skill-high 
technology 
4 759 Parts of computers/office 
machines 
38 High skill-high 
technology 
5 764 Telecom equipment  24 High skill-high 
technology 
6 714 Non-electrical 
engines/motors 
4 Medium skill-
medium 
technology-
capital intensive 
7 541 Medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products 
8 High skill-high 
technology 
8 781 Passenger motor 
vehicles 
9 Medium skill-
medium 
technology-
capital intensive 
9 792 Aircraft and equipment  6 High skill-high 
technology 
10 846 Knitted undergarments 57 Labour-intensive- 
low technology 
11 893 Plastic materials 23 Medium skill-
medium 
technology-
capital intensive 
12 514 Nitrogen compounds 11 High skill-high 
technology 
13 771 Electric power machinery 37 Medium skill-
medium 
technology-
capital intensive 
14 553 Perfumery and cosmetics 10 High skill-high 
technology 
15 772 Electrical apparatus 24 Medium skill-
medium 
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technology-
capital intensive 
16 872 Medical instruments  12 High skill-high 
technology 
17 778 Electrical machinery 23 Medium skill-
medium 
technology-
capital intensive 
18 515 Organo-
inorganic/heterocyclic 
compounds 
9 High skill-high 
technology 
19 821 Furniture 21 Labour-intensive- 
low technology 
20 773 Electricity distributing 
equipment 
34 Medium skill-
medium 
technology-
capital intensive 
Source : Mayer et al (2002) table 2 and  1 
Note a) share refers to 1998 1 
Using UNCTAD’s own classification most dynamic products tend to be either in 
relatively high skill- high technology lines (although there is ambiguity in this classification 
that we return to below) in electronics and related products (for example computers and 
their component parts, precision equipment and pharmaceuticals) or in medium 
technology relatively capital intensive products where scale economies are important (like 
passenger vehicles and electrical machinery). The dynamic labour intensive product lines 
are in clothing and furniture.  Different rankings are obtained using different measures of 
dynamism but the ranking by simple annual growth has four products out the top five in 
table 1 in its top five.  
The developing country share is slightly misleading as it includes the first tier NIEs 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) and arguably this is a misleading 
classification for these economies. None the less as expected developing countries take 
relatively small shares world exports in several capital intensive product lines (for example 
passenger motor vehicles), often below 10%. However they take a majority share in the 
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only clothing product shown (knitted under-garments) and a significant (that is over 30%) 
share in some very fast growing high technology products (transistors and semi-
conductors, computers and their parts). The standard interpretation of this phenomenon 
(that is developing countries exporting high technology goods) is that the classification 
high technology refers to the overall product not to all of the processes used to produce it 
and that due to the process of international division of labour (vertical specialisation) 
production of the labour-intensive stages of the production of these goods has shifted to 
developing countries. 
IV. Classification of export products: sophistication 
Path-breaking work by Lall created a taxonomy of products based on their R and D 
intensity (that is R and D costs as a proportion of sales value) and this has been used 
widely to classify export structure (Lall 2000). This groups exports into nine technology 
categories by this R and D measure. Table 2 illustrates the approach using China’s export 
structure in 2000. Broadly speaking by this classification, low technology products still 
dominate exports, although the share of high technology products is rising rapidly. A 
formal test of the similarity in export structure for 2000 found China to be closer to Korea 
and Taiwan in 1990 than to most of ASEAN in 2000. It was still very dissimilar from Japan 
(Lall and Albaladejo 2004).     
Table 2: China’s manufactured export structure 2000 
Technology category % of manufactured 
exports 
Growth 1990-2000 % pa 
Resource-based 9.5 12.3 
Low technology 44.9 15.2 
Of which   
Fashion cluster 27.9 13.3 
Others 17.0 19.4 
Medium technology 21.2 14.1 
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Of which   
Automotive 1.9 1.3 
Process 6.2 15.7 
Engineering 13.1 17.7 
High technology 24.4 32.7 
Of which   
Electronics 21.7 36.1 
Others 2.7 19.8 
Source: Lall and Albaladejo (2004: table 1) 
A limitation of this analysis is that it does not allow for a distinction between production 
processes and products, since even relatively technologically advanced goods can still 
have simple labour-intensive stages in their production. In response to this Lall et al 
(2006) attempted to differentiate between products at the disaggregate level and to create 
an index (calculated at the 4 digit level) to capture their sophistication. This was done for 
766 individual product categories by taking a weighted average of the incomes of all 
exporters of the good concerned with the weights given by their share in total world trade 
in the good.  Hence we have 
                                   SIi  = ∑(Xik/Xiw)*Yk                                 (1) 
               where SIi is the sophistication index for good i, Xik is exports of i from country k, 
Xiw is world exports of i , Yk is income per capita in k and summation is for all k. 
 Lall et al (2006) use SI in various ways including ranking between countries at the 
aggregate level (where SI is aggregated over all products in total trade), for comparing 
technology classifications and for establishing patterns within broad categories like textiles 
and electronics.  The rationale is that within individual product categories the average 
income of exporting countries can be a useful proxy of the technological depth of a 
product; hence an electrical good from Japan may be deemed to have higher technology 
content than the same good from the Philippines. Similarly within apparel products 
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exported by rich countries –or processes undertaken by them – are taken to be more skill, 
technology or marketing intensive and to yield higher profit margins and wages than the 
more standardized goods exported by poorer countries.   
A comparison of the index scores with the technology classification of Lall (2000) is 
given in table 3.   
Table 3: Average SI by technology category 4-digit level for world trade in 2000 
Category Score   
 Developed country Developing country  
Resource-based 1 (agro-
based) 
70.41 54.93 
Resource-based 2 (mineral-
based) 
67.00 58.00 
Low technology 1 (fashion) 44.26 38.74 
Low technology 2 (others) 67.32 62.06 
Medium technology 1 
(automotive) 
78.34 76.25 
Medium technology 2 
(process industry) 
72.74 62.86 
Medium technology 3 
(engineering) 
77.72 67.94 
High technology 1 
(electronics and electricals 
68.74 65.68 
High technology 2 (other) 84.88 78.80 
Source Lall et al (2006) table 6 1 
 The links between the technology classification and the index are very limited no 
doubt reflecting the fact that the technology categories cover a range of products and 
processes. There is an association at the top and the bottom of the technology range. 
Hence high technology 2 products (the non-electronics) have the highest SI score and 
there is a clear distinction between all high technology goods and the fashion cluster 
(textile and clothing) in the low technology category.  However the other low technology 
category has score that is not very different from the electronic high technology group, no 
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doubt reflecting product fragmentation with the shift of assembly and simple operations in 
electronics to low wage locations. 
 In this analysis China appears only a modest outlier in 2000 (although more recent 
work will be needed to check the current situation). In terms of its overall SI China ranks 
20th out of 30 countries for which a detailed analysis was undertaken. However more 
significantly when the SI is regressed on income per capita China appears above the 
regression line with a score about 1% above that predicted. However for the positive 
deviation from the predicted score for China is in fact lower than that for most of the NIE 
and middle income economies including Taiwan, Argentina, Thailand, South Africa, 
Malaysia, Brazil, the Philippines and Mexico (Lall et al 2006, Figure 1). Within the 
important sector of electronics China’s sophistication score is almost exactly that predicted 
by its income level. In automotive products however its score is 11% above that predicted 
(Lall et al 2006: 234). 
V. Classification of export products: productivity 
Independently Hausmann et al (2007) applied the same approach, but using a different 
weighting system. Here PROD represents the income level of a particular good 
(calculated at the 6 digit level) but unlike the SI the weights used are the revealed 
comparative advantage of each country in the good concerned. Hence we have  
             PRODi  = ∑ ((Xik / Xtk)/(Xiw/Xtw))*Yk                       (2) 
              where PRODi is the income level for good i, as before Xik is exports of i from 
country k, Xiw is world exports of i, Yk is income per capita in k and summation is for all k. 
In addition Xtk is total exports of country k and Xtw is total world exports. 
              Rearranging we have  
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                 PRODi  =  ∑ ((Xik  / Xiw )* (Xtw / Xtk ))* Yk            (3) 
            The weights that result from the expression in brackets in (3) are then normalized 
to sum to unity. The difference from the procedure in (1) is that now the share of country k 
in world trade in product i is multiplied by the inverse of k’s share in total world trade. This 
has the effect, which is intentional, of giving a higher weight to goods exported from small 
countries. Hence in this view even if the US exports more shirts say than Bangladesh if 
shirts are a product in which Bangladesh has specialized, but the US has not, they should 
be seen as a low productivity product. 
 Hausmann et al (2007) apply their PROD indicator to total trade of individual 
countries to calculate an overall measure akin to the sophistication index. What they term 
the ‘productivity level of an economy’s export basket’ EXPY is a weighted average of 
PROD for all commodities with the weights given by their share in a country’s trade. Their 
focus is on long term trends and they relate EXPY to performance growth over time and 
contrast actual EXPY with that expected for an economy’s income level. As Lall et al 
(2006) point out because equation (1) uses trade shares as weights and because middle 
income economies have been gaining world market share in many products, there is a 
tendency for the SI for individual products to fall in nominal terms over time. This means 
that using SI it is more meaningful to compare country and product ranking at a point of 
time rather than analysing trends in its absolute value.  An advantage of the weighting 
scheme of Hausmann et al is that as one would not expect revealed comparative 
advantage weights to shift systematically towards middle income economies there is no 
reason why PROD should decline for individual products. Hence at the product level 
dynamic comparisons over time are meaningful. However at the country level, EXPY as 
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the weighted average of PROD for individual products can fall due to a change in the 
composition of export basket. This in fact is the case overall as the mean of EXPY across 
the country sample declines between 1992 and 2003 (Hausmann et al 2007 table 4).  
However whilst equation (2) may have an advantage at the product level the weighting 
scheme used to construct the PROD scores on which it is based is questionable. The idea 
behind SI is that good exported by predominantly high income countries have 
characteristics (partly reflecting technology but other features as well) that differ from 
those of goods exported by predominantly low or middle income economies. The rationale 
for using an indicator deliberately skewed towards goods exported by small exporting 
economies at any income level is not clear. Table 4 gives a simple illustration for two 
economies (one larger than the other in trading terms) and a third economy taken as the 
rest of the world. It shows how the country weights differ for SI and for PROD and how the 
absolute values of the indicators change as a result. Further when two products are 
compared, depending upon the trade shares and income levels involved, it is possible for 
one to have a higher SI but a lower PROD as compared with the other product. In this 
case the two indicators will give conflicting comparisons between the two products.  
Table 4: Illustrations: products a and b 
Product a Country 1 Country 2 ROW World  
Exports a 4000 4000 8,000 16,000 
Total exports 20,000 40,000 100,000 160,000 
Income per 
capita 
1300 2500 3000  
Weights (1) 0.25 0.25 0.5  
SIa  2137.5    
Weights (3) 0.526 0.263 0.210  
PRODa 1644.7    
     
Exports b 2000 8000 10000 20,000 
Total exports 20,000 40,000 100,000 160,000 
Income per 1300 2500 3000  
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capita 
Weights (1) 0.10 0.40 0.50  
SIb 2130    
PRODb 1700    
 
 Table 4 shows two countries 1 and 2 and a third the rest of the world (ROW) and 
two products a and b. For a countries 1 and 2 have the same export value and hence the 
same share in world trade and thus using (1) the weights on their income per capita are 
equal. Their incomes per capita are close at $1300 and $1250 respectively and well below 
the ROW average of $3000. The SI using these income figures and weights is $2137.5. 
However applying (3) we must allow for the different size of a and b in world trade.  The 
total exports of 1 are half those of 2 and as in (3) trade share must be multiplied by the 
inverse of the country’s share in world trade ((Xtw / Xtk), this means that when the weights 
from (3) are normalized relative to unity that on 1 is twice the weight on 2 and more than 
twice that on the rest of the world. In other words despite their exporting similar values, 
country 1 is twice as specialised in a as is country 2. The resulting PROD for a is $1644.7 
 Comparison between the absolute values of SI and PROD is not meaningful as 
they are specified in different ways but a comparison across products using both 
indicators as alternatives should cast light on the nature of the products. Table 4 also 
shows similar data for product b. Here country 2 exports four times as much of b as 
country 1 and hence the share of 2 in world trade is four times as high. The relevant SI is 
$2130, which is slightly below that of a. However the share of b in total exports is twice as 
high in 1 as in 2 and thus using (3) the weight on country 1 is twice that on 2. The resulting 
value of PROD is $1700. Thus in a comparison between a and b, SI suggests b is the 
more ‘sophisticated’, whilst PROD suggests that b has the ‘higher productivity.’  
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 Which judgement is correct depends on interpretation. Are technologically 
sophisticated high productivity goods those where high income economies dominate the 
world market in sales or are they the goods in which such countries specialise? The 
analysis in Lall et al implies the answer is the former and that of Hausmann et al that the 
latter is correct. Part of the difficulty is in product disaggregation. Returning to the shirts 
example even if they are within the same 4 or 6 digit classification the US shirts may be 
non-competing with those from Bangladesh due to brand or quality differences. If this is 
the case, using trade shares as weights the error will be smaller than using revealed 
comparative advantage. 
VI. The Chinese case 
 Rodrik (2006) uses the EXPY indicator to analyse China’s exports arguing that its 
export structure is skewed considerably more than expected for its income level towards 
high productivity goods and that this has been an important feature of its economic 
performance and high export growth. As he puts it ‘ had China only exported those goods 
that countries at China’s level of income tend to export, its growth rate would have been 
significantly lower’ (Rodrik 206: 13). 
 Lall et al (2006) agree with the general thrust of the argument that what a country 
exports clearly matters.  As noted above earlier work has shown that China’s technology 
composition of exports has shifted towards the medium and high technology end of the 
spectrum although its structure still does not match that of the original Tiger economies 
and even newer arrivals like Thailand and Malaysia. When SI per country is related to 
income per capita in 2000 China is found to be an outlier (as it is in Rodrik 2006) but not 
dramatically so. Its SI score is higher than predicted based on a simple regression against 
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income and is higher than that of India and Indonesia, however the positive deviation from 
the predicted score for China is in fact lower than that for most of the NIE and middle 
income economies including Taiwan, Argentina, Thailand, South Africa, Malaysia, Brazil 
the Philippines and Mexico. In Rodrik’s results for 2003 not all of these countries are 
included, but China has a much larger deviation than Brazil and a slightly larger one than 
for Mexico. Hence using the SI index, at least for 2000, China appears much less special 
than in the analysis of Rodrik (2006). 
 The growth analysis of Hausmann et al (2007) considers whether initial levels of 
export productivity as measured by EXPY can explain subsequent growth controlling for 
initial income levels.  The results show a positive and significant relation between EXPY in 
1992 and subsequent growth 1992-2003. The estimated coefficient on EXPY implies that 
‘a doubling of the productivity level of a country’s exports results in an increase in its 
overall per capita GDP growth of around 6%’ (Rodrik 2006: 13). When we test for a similar 
double-log relation between initial SI in 2000 and subsequent growth 2000- 2005 
controlling for income per capita, however unlike the results in Hausmann et al (2007) 
where export productivity has a significant positive relation with subsequent growth, we 
find SI to be very weakly significant, but with a negative sign. Further in this simple 
regression model China is a major positive outlier with nearly seven percentage points of 
its average annual growth unexplained. The analysis is very simple and clearly other 
factors need to be brought into the model, but at first sight SI seems a much less powerful 
explanatory factor for China’s growth than EXPY. 
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VII. Conclusions and future research 
 Even accepting the basic argument of Hausmann et al (2007) and of Rodrik (2006) 
that the structure of export products matters for growth, at the macro level it is not possible 
to replicate their results using the Sensitivity Index. There can be a number of reasons for 
differences in results. One is the different periods chosen. More likely to be significant 
however are differences of level of disaggregation and weighting. Hausmann et al (2007) 
work at the six digit level, whilst Lall et al (2006) work at four digits. It is clearly preferable 
in this form of analysis to disaggregate as far as possible and the Sensitivity Index could 
usefully be extended to the six digit level. Slightly paradoxically we argue that although it 
is difficult to say one weighting scheme is unambiguously superior to the other, the more 
disaggregate the analysis the more likely it is that weighting by trade value, as in Lall et al 
(2006), will be more accurate than weighting by revealed comparative advantage. 
However Lall et al do not stress the macro economic dimension of the SI preferring to 
focus on what it may reveal on differences within and between product categories. This 
differs from the focus in Hausmann et al and Rodrik which is principally on trends in macro 
performance, so that it is mainly the aggregate measure EXPY covering all exports rather 
than the product level estimates PROD, which matter.  
 On the specific analysis of China the shift in its export structure has been 
highlighted a number of times. However use of the Sensitivity Index to reflect export 
structure shows China to be rather less special than the analysis of Rodrik (2006). This is 
also true for the important sector of electronics. This may partly be due to the fact that 
China’s export structure is shifting rapidly and Rodrik’s analysis focuses on 2003, whilst 
the Sensitivity Index for China is calculated for 2000. The difference in weighting scheme 
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may also be important here. However in our results much less of China’s outlier status 
seems due to the type of goods it was exporting (at least in 2000). 
 Future research can helpfully clarify these aspects. Both sophistication and 
productivity product measures can be updated and compared and used in further 
analyses of trade structure. China’s outlier status can be reassessed in a more detailed 
model and Rodrik’s growth analysis for China can be revised and extended with the 
addition of further explanatory variables. An important test will be of the basic hypothesis 
that ‘rich country manufactures’ face better price or demand prospects that those 
manufactures in which poor countries are major exporters on the world market or in which 
they specialise. Either one or both of the indicators examined here can be applied in this 
test.  
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